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Abstract
*
With a large-scale econometric world model we derive policy multipliers and the
parameters for the utility functions for 10 EMU countries and for the ECB. The gains
from cooperation are calculated by comparing two equilibria, a Nash and a
cooperative equilibrium. The cooperative equilibrium is the result of the
maximization of a weighted utility function for Euroland as a whole with the targets
output gap and inflation. In the case of a “full” cooperation, where the 10 EMU
countries coordinate their fiscal policy with the monetary policy of the ECB the
welfare gains are very large for the whole Euro zone. However the strong fiscal and
monetary policy impulses as a result of this optimization procedure lead, firstly, to a
violation of the fiscal targets (budget deficit, public debt) of the Stability and Growth
Pact which limits the room for manoeuvre of fiscal policy of the EMU member states
in stage III of EMU. Secondly, we find that not in all countries cooperation leads to
welfare gains, a result which is not Pareto efficient. Therefore, by considering these
two constraints (Pareto optimality and SGP objectives) the constrained optimization
results in a solution in case of “full” cooperation which drives most countries back to
the Nash position of the baseline. In addition, a “partial” cooperation in which the
ECB stays aside and only the fiscal policies of the EMU member countries are taking
part, leads to a very small welfare improvement and violates again (only to minor
degree the Pareto optimality condition). The optimal fiscal policy impulses are very
modest.
JEL Classification: C70, E52, E58, E62
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INTRODUCTION
The new policy regime of EMU justifies to raise the old question whether policy
coordination makes countries better off. On the one hand the Maastricht Treaty
demands economic policy coordination in Article 99
1. On the other hand the
division of responsibility of economic policy making in EMU is unique. An
independent European Central Bank (ECB) is responsible for the monetary
policy for Euroland, whereas the EMU member countries still are the indivudal
actors of the fiscal policy. However, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) limits
fiscal expansion. These specific rules of the policy game imply different
combinations for possible cooperations: either the EMU member countries
cooperate in pursuing their fiscal policy and/or they cooperate with each other
and with the ECB. The primary target for the ECB is to maintain price stability.
Presently the most urgent target for the EMU member countries is full
employment. However, reading the Articles of the TEC concerning coordination
and those of the SGP (in particular Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7
July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the
surveillance and “coordination” of economic policies) one gets the impression
that coordination in the EMU primarily has a negative or passive connotation
(medium-term objective of “sound budgetary positions close to balance or in
surplus”). Normally, economic policy coordination aims at improving the
economic position of a group of countries (positive or active connotation).
Several authors have already dealt with economic policy cooperation in
EMU. However, most of them either used theoretically calibrated models
(Krichel-Levine-Pearlman, 1996) or heavily stylized models ( Hughes-Hallet,
1998). In each case two countries are combined with one ECB.  Huizinga-
Nielsen (1998) ask whether policy coordination of fiscal deficits is necessary at
all and under which theoretical conditions it may make sense. Karner (1999)
analyses within a game-theoretic model with three countries and one ECB the
outcome of the maximization of intertemporal utilities of countries and of the
ECB (the latter also maximizes the levels of debt of the EMU countries?). Van
Aarle-Engwerda-Plasmans-Weeren (1999) calibrate a two-country EMU with
one ECB in the style of a New Keynesian disequilibrium model with
unemployment. Rolf (1996) analyses game-theoretically the different aspects of
cooperation within a fiscal solidarity union (“fiscal federalism”) in the EMU.
Non-cooperation would lead to higher optimal debts.  Levine (1997) studies
theoretically the possible interactions of EMU-”ins” and “outs and the
consequences of the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central
bank. The empirical evidence on international economic policy coordination is
generally neither overwhelmingly positive, nor are the gains very high (see for a
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recent survey  Mooslechner-Schürz (1999).  McKibbin (1997) in his review
mentions gains from 0.5 to 1 percent of GDP at most.
We deal with the possible outcome of coordinating economic policy in the
EMU. This means on the one hand full coordination of fiscal and monetary
policy between the EMU member states and the ECB and on the other hand only
fiscal policy coordination among the EMU member states. The special problem
of the policy interaction of the “ins” of EMU and the “pre-ins” is not addressed
here. In order to derive welfare gains from policy cooperation in EMU, we apply
a large-scale econometric model (Oxford Economic Forecasting – OEF – World
model). This allows us to quantify welfare gains with real-world data and leads
therefore to realistic policy conclusions. In doing so, we follow the classic
approach by Oudiz-Sachs (1984). They did this exercise with two world models
for three countries (USA, Japan and Germany). We do it with one world model
for the specific policy constellation of EMU (11 countries plus the ECB).
After describing the framework of economic policy in EMU (chapter 1)
we present evidence on policy multipliers of fiscal and monetary policy in EMU
member countries. This gives an idea of the economic interdependencies in
EMU (chapter 2). In chapter 3 we describe the strategy to measure welfare gains
from cooperation. With the help of the large-scale econometric world model the
concrete welfare gains of cooperation are derived under different scenarios: full
cooperation (EMU countries plus ECB) and only cooperation among the EMU
countries.
1. THE NEW POLICY REPONSIBILITY IN EMU AND RULES OF
COOPERATION
2
Compared to the benchmark country USA one has the impression that the
European Union seems to have planned to create an EMU with an asymmetric
economic policy framework. Whereas in the USA both, monetary and fiscal
policy are centralised and they dispose of an inter-state transfer mechanism
(fiscal federalism) which seems to be appropriate to cushion asymmetric or
idiosyncratic shocks, the coming EMU is build upon an asymmetric architecture
concerning economic policy.
According to the ideal architecture of economic policy laid down in the
Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) the EMU framework
combines a centralised monetary policy (under the responsibility of the ECB)
with decentralised fiscal or budgetary policies (under the responsibility of
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national governments, subject to Community rules on budgetary discipline, as
the Stability and Growth Pact) and decentralised structural policies and wage
setting (see Table 1).
This ideal Euro world implies a simple and clear assignment of policies:
the single monetary policy would, given the primary objective of preserving
price stability, be able to provide a common response to aggregate economic
development (see  European Commission, 1997B), whereas decentralised
budgetary policies and other national economic policy instruments would be
available for responding to country-specific circumstances (or shocks).
After the Decision of the Council of the European Union, meeting in the
composition of Heads of States or Government of May 3, 1998, the EMU started
on January 1, 1999 with eleven countries. Based on Article 99(2) of the TEC the
European Commission (1998, p. 4) has put forward "Broad Guidelines of the
Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community" for the "ins" and
the "pre-ins" of the EMU, which were confirmed by the Council
Recommendation 98/454/EC of 6 July 1998.  In its "growth and stability-
oriented macroeconomic policy mix" scenario the Commission stresses that the
overall macroeconomic policy mix at the euro-zone level (for the "ins") will
result from the interaction of the common monetary policy on the one hand and
with the average budgetary development and wage trends in the participating
countries, on the other. According to this script for an ideal economic world in
Euroland of 11 EU Member States, in the framework of the Treaty,
supplemented by the Stability and Growth Pact and the Amsterdam European
Council resolution on 'Growth and Employment', the responsibilities are
allocated as follows:
•  The single monetary policy in the euro-area will be under the responsibility
of the independent ECB and ESCB. In conformity with Article 105(1), the
primary objective of monetary policy will be to maintain price stability and,
subject thereto, to support the economic objectives of the Union, including,
in particular, sustained, non-inflationary, growth and high level of
employment, as laid down in Article 2 of the Treaty.
•  Budgetary policy will remain in the responsibility of national governments
but will be subject to the rules of the Treaty (Article 101 to 104) and the
Stability and Growth Pact, which emphasises the need to have a budgetary
position close to balance or in surplus in normal economic conditions and
clarifies the key Treaty provisions on budgetary policy. National
governments will have to coordinate their budgetary policies in the
framework of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (Art. 99).RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 6
Table 1: The Framework of Economic Policy in EMU with “Ins” and “Pre-ins”
Monetary Policy Fiscal (Budgetary) Policy Incomes and Wage Policy
11 Euro- “ins”
Centralised
(ESCB and ECB are
responsible)
Art. 105 and Protocol 18, Art.
2: ESCB and ECB: Primary
objective: price stability;
support of the general
economic policies with a view
of the objectives of the
Community (Art. 2)
Decentralised
(governments of the Member
States are responsible)
restricted by the
Stability and Growth Pact:
Deficit < 3% of GDP
(clarification of the excessive
deficit procedure of Art. 104
in Reg. (EC) 1467/97);
no Fiscal Federalism in the
EU
no bail-out (Art. 103(1))
(and declaration by the








99(3) and (4) and Reg. (EC)
1466/97): Stability
programmes before March 1,
1999, thereafter annually
Decentralised
(Social Partners in the
Member States are
responsible)
Resolution of the European




Guidelines of the Economic
Policies of the Member States
and the Community
(II/144/98, 13.5.98) suggest a
"productivity oriented wage
policy" which is enough
"flexible" to make the labour
markets more efficient
(Mundell's precondition for




(National central banks - NCB -
are responsible)
new exchange-rate mechanism
in stage III of EMU - ERM2
(“hub and spokes” model): Euro
is the anchor - standard
fluctuation band
+/-15% against the Euro
(participation in ERM2 is
voluntary: Resolution of the
European Council 97/C 236/03)
Decentralised
(Member States are responsible)
obligation to avoid excessive
deficits (Art. 104 and Art.
116(4); each EU member is
obliged to a stability oriented
economic policy and to
economic policy coordination
(“economic policies as a matter
of common concern”: Art. 99)
Multilateral surveillance (Art.
99(3) and (4) and Reg. (EC)
1466/97): Convergence
programmes before March 1,
1999, thereafter annually.
Decentralised
(Social Partners in the Member
States are responsible)
(The Articles refer to the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) à la Amsterdam)RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 7
•  Wage setting will remain in the responsibility of the social partners at the
national, regional, sectoral or even at a more decentralised level following
their respective traditions. As underlined in the Amsterdam Resolution on
"Growth and employment" (97/C 236/02), the social partners are responsible
for reconciling high employment with appropriate wage settlements and for
setting up a suitable framework for the wage formation process. Since they
have an important bearing on the overall macroeconomic policy mix,
aggregate wage developments are of general interest." ( European
Commission, 1998, p. 4).
For the countries not participating initially in the euro-zone (the "pre-ins")
the  European Commission (1998, p. 5) stresses that "the need for stability-
oriented and convergent macroeconomic policies will be equally strong,
especially if they participate in the ERM2, as countries with a derogation are
expected to. The strong economic and monetary interdependence between the
euro-area countries and the Member States not as yet adopting the euro and the
need to ensure further convergence and a smooth functioning of the single
market, will require that all Member States are included in the co-ordination of
economic policies."
The EU in general and the EMU in particular bases its procedure of policy
coordination on a set of principles (layed down in the Treaty and in the SGP):
monitoring and controlling which results in a rolling agenda establishing an
annual cycle for the “mainstream” coordination process (see Italianer, 1999, p.
20). There are several forms of coordination: (a) procedural framework
(participation in the Council (Ecofin) of 15 Member States, the Commission and
the president of the ECB); Euro-11 group only on the “ins” of EMU, formality,
assistance, decision rules), (b) exchange of information (indicators, definitions),
(c) common analytical framework (models, policy impact, forecasts), (d)
monitoring (performance, policy intentions, early warning, multilateral
surveillance), (e) take account of policy interactions with others (expression of
preferences) and (f) joint determination of policies (regularly, discretionary; see
Italianer, 1999, p. 5).
The provisions concerning economic policy coordination are ruled in the
TEC in general and in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
3 for stage three of
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deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 02/08/1997, pp. 6-11); Resolution of the European Council on
the Stability and Growth Pact, Amsterdam, 17 June 1997 (OJ C 236, 02/08/1997, p. 1);RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 8
the EMU in particular. Article 99(1) says that the “Member States shall regard
their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall  coordinate
them within the Council ...”. “The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority
on a recommendation from the Commission, formualte a draft for the broad
guidelines of the eocnomic policies of the Member States and the Community,
and shall report its finding to the European Council” (Article 99(2)). Article
99(3) rules the monitoring procedure for closer cooperation of economic policies
and sustained convergence of the economic performance of the Member States
with a system of multilateral surveillance. The SGP (Council Regulation (EC)
No 1466/97) then sets out the rules covering the content, the submission, the
examination and the monitoring of stability programmes (for the “ins” of EMU)
and the convergence programmes (for the “pre-ins” of EMU) – to be submitted
to the Commission annually for a medium-term period of three years – “as part
of the multilateral surveillance by the Council so as to prevent, at an early stage,
the occurrence of excessive general deficits and to promote the surveillance and
coordination of economic policies”.
The scope of coordination in EMU – according to Italianer (1999, p. 10) -
can comprise monetary policy, fiscal or budgetary policy, exchange rate policy,
labour markets (wage setting, structural aspects, active policies), tax policies,
social security systems, product markets (goods, services), capital marktes. We
restrict our analysis to the two major policy insruments, namely monetary and
fiscal policy.
The next question concerns the levels of coordination in EMU. Italianer
(1999, p. 13-15) identifies three EU levels for coordination: (1) The highest
coordination level in the EU is that of the Heads of State and Government, in
particular through the European Council (of which the president of the European
Commission is also a member) that meets in presence of Ecofin Ministers when
issues of relevance to EMU are discussed. (2) At the Ministerial level, the main
co-ordinating bodies are the Council and the Euro-11 group. For matters related
to EMU and taxation, the most relevant Council formation is that of Economic
and Finance Ministers (Ecofin), while for employment policies the
Employment/Social Affairs Council takes the lead. The ECB president is invited
to the Ecofin and also to the more informal Euro-11 group. In the latter national
delegations are restricted to two persons (the Minister plus the relevant member
of the Economic and Financial Committee). The European Commission is
present both at the Council (Ecofin) and the Euro-11 meetings. The social
partners are involved in the coordination process at Ministerial level through the
participation of the main European employers‘ and employees‘ organisations in
the so-called European Social Dialogue. (3) The Senior officials level consists of
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several committees. In the EMU area, the most important is the Economic and
Financial Committee (since January 1, 1999 the sucessor of the Monetary
Committee, according to Article 114(2) TEC), which has advisory and
preparatory functions in preparing the Council meetings. It is composed of two
representatives of each EMU member state (one from the administration –
finance ministry, one from the national central bank) and two Commission and
ECB representatives each. So it is a body for informal dialogue between
officials from the economic and moneatry poles. In addition there are other
committees for different purposes (the Economic Policy Committee, the
Employment Committee, the Banking Advisory Committe, the Banking
Supervision Committee, the Code of Conduct Group business taxation, the
Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics).
The Treaty and the SGP always speak of economic policy “coordination”.
This is the more rigorous form of economic cooperation, involving a
complicated procedure of mutually agreed guidelines and commitments how to
conduct monetary and fiscal policies, as layed down in the Treaty. A narrower
form of interaction, often used in game theory, is the notion of economic
“cooperation” in contrast to non-cooperation. In a game-theory context this
latter notion is more adequate, also it does not cover the more complicated form
of coordination as those of the EMU
4. Athough we aim at studying the
implications of different scenarios of cooperation in EMU, technically speaking
we have to restrict our calculations to the more narrow form of economic policy
cooperation.
2. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES IN EMU
The first way to evaluate the macroeconomic interdependencies is to study the
evidence on policy multipliers. For this purpose we apply a large-scale world
macromodel (OEF, 1999). It encompasses 10 EMU countries (only Luxembourg
is left out), as well as the major OECD countries. For the purpose of studying
policy multipliers we only look at interdependencies within the EMU area. The
simulation horizon is 1999-2001. Euroland is already modeled insofar as the 10
EU countries participating in the EMU have fixed bilateral exchange rates
starting with 1Q1999 according to the conversion rates fixed on December 31,
1998. In addition, the ECB is emulated by assuming the same short-interest rate
levels in Euroland. And the Euro is already anticipated and calculated against
third country currencies, like the US-Dollar (USD) or the British Pound (GBP).
So when simulating shocks one already anticipates the monetary behaviour of
the European Central Bank (ECB). Its monetary policy reaction function follows
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something like a Taylor rule: the short-term interest rate adjusts in response both
to the gap between a target for the stock of money and its actual value and to the
gap between potential output and actual output.
We compare a fiscal policy stimulus with a monetary policy expansion.
Fiscal policy expansion is measured by an increase of real goverment spending
of one percent of GDP, executed individually by each of the 10 EMU member
countries (Luxemburg excluded). Monetary expansion (done for the whole EMU
area by the ECB) is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of short-term
interest rate (uniform in all EMU countries).
As expected from a Mundell-Fleming type world macro model the own
policy multipliers after a fiscal shock are large compared to the spill-overs to
partner countries. The latter are mostly positive in sign. The two-years short-
term GDP multipliers range from 0.3 (in Belgium) to 1.0 (in Italy). Inflation
goes up, unemployment decreases (see Table 2). The budget deficit increases, as
well as public debt. The current account deteriorates (see Table 3 ). Monetary
policy (done centrally by the ECB for the whole EMU area) has a positive
impact on real GDP and inflation, and reduces unemployment (see Table 2 ).
However, the impact on budget deficit and public debt is positive. The results as
far as the current account is concerned are mixed (see Table 3 ). As in the
theoretical Mundell-Fleming model, fiscal policy expansion leads to an
appreciation of the Euro agains the US-Dollar. Accordingly, the monetary
expansion results in a depreciation of the Euro (see Table 3).
The fact that the size of the fiscal policy multipliers varies within the
EMU from country to country is of course the consequence of a still not fully
harmonized economic performance of the EMU members. Neither is the
business cycle of all EMU members synchronized, nor are the responses of the
economies similar to identical policy shocks. Differences in policy multipliers
may also add to the catalogue of conditions which identify an optimum currency
area (OCA). In addition to labour market flexibility (Mundell’s criterium), a
similar impact of policy impulses in a group of countries indicates that these
countries would belong to an OCA rather than countries which react differently.
But even within the so-called DM core, consisting of countries whose currencies
more or less moved alongside the DM in the last decade, namely Austria,
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and of course Germany, policy responses are
not as similar as one would expect (see Table 2).RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 11













And policy y p u Y p u y P u y p u y p u
I. Fiscal Policy
b
Belgium (B) 0,26 0,77 -0,10 0,02 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,03 0,02 -0,01
Germany (D) 0,05 0,05 -0,02 0,81 0,30 -0,50 -0,08 -0,04 0,02 -0,02 -0,04 0,01 0,04 0,02 -0,02
Spain (E) 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,02 0,00 0,78 0,18 -0,23 0,03 -0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00
France (F) 0,07 0,12 -0,02 0,03 -0,01 -0,02 0,03 -0,01 -0,01 0,79 0,41 -0,07 0,06 0,02 -0,03
Ireland (IRL) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,52 0,11 -0,20
Italy (I) -0,01 -0,08 0,01 -0,03 -0,03 0,01 -0,07 -0,03 0,02 -0,01 -0,03 0,01 -0,06 -0,01 0,02
Netherlands (NL) 0,01 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,01 -0,02 -0,01 0,01 -0,02 -0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,01
Austria (A) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00
Portugal (P) 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00




European Central 0,44 1,38 -0,16 0,53 0,36 -0,30 0,63 0,28 -0,17 0,47 0,42 -0,07 0,81 0,27 -0,29
Bank (ECB)
Source: Own calculations with the Oxford Economic Forecasting Model (OEF model: Emerging Market Model, December 1998).
a. The table gives multipliers averaged over two years (1999-2000); y = real GDP (measured as a percentage deviation from a baseline); p = inflation
rate (measured as a percentage-point deviation from a baseline); u = unemploymente rate (measured as a percentage-point deviation from a baseline).
b. Fiscal policy (responsibility rests on the EMU member states) is measured by the increase of real government spending of one percent of real
GDP.
c. Monetary policy (responsibility rests on the ECB) is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of short-term interest rate (uniform in all EMU
countries).
EMU = Economic and Monetary Union.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 12











and policy y p u y p u y p U y p u y p u
I. Fiscal Policy
b
Belgium (B) 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,04 0,02 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00
Germany (D) 0,03 -0,03 -0,01 0,07 0,03 -0,02 0,14 0,00 -0,05 -0,07 -0,03 0,03 -0,03 -0,01 0,01
Spain (E) 0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,01 0,06 0,03 -0,03 -0,01 -0,01 0,00
France (F) 0,04 -0,02 -0,01 0,03 0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,05 0,00 0,01
Ireland (IRL) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Italy (I) 1,03 0,61 -0,31 -0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,00 -0,12 -0,07 0,05 -0,07 -0,03 0,02
Netherlands (NL) -0,02 -0,02 0,01 0,87 0,34 -0,20 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,03 -0,02 0,01 -0,02 -0,01 0,01
Austria (A) 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,46 0,10 -0,16 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00
Portugal (P) 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,71 0,67 -0,31 0,01 0,00 0,00




European Central 0,44 0,46 -0,12 0,54 0,23 -0,11 0,51 0,27 -0,13 0,78 0,60 -0,32 0,61 0,32 -0,17
Bank (ECB)
Source: Own calculations with the Oxford Economic Forecasting Model (OEF model: Emerging Market Model, December 1998).
a. The table gives multipliers averaged over two years (1999-2000); y = real GDP (measured as a percentage deviation from a baseline); p = inflation
rate (measured as a percentage-point deviation from a baseline); u = unemploymente rate (measured as a percentage-point deviation from a baseline).
b. Fiscal policy (responsibility rests on the EMU member states) is measured by the increase of real government spending of one percent of real
GDP.
c. Monetary policy (responsibility rests on the ECB) is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of short-term interest rate (uniform in all EMU
countries).
EMU = Economic and Monetary Union.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 13
Table 3: Policy Multipliers for Government Budget, Gross Public Debt, and Current Balance in Euroland (EMU)
a













and policy D B cb d b cb d b Cb d b Cb d b cb
I. Fiscal Policy
b
Belgium (B) -1,01 0,39 -0,28 0,01 -0,02 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,02 0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,02
Germany (D) -0,02 -0,08 0,18 -0,71 0,09 -0,45 -0,05 0,09 0,09 -0,05 0,05 0,09 -0,13 0,10 0,13
Spain (E) -0,01 0,01 0,03 -0,01 0,01 0,02 -0,87 0,30 -0,55 0,00 -0,01 0,03 -0,02 0,03 0,04
France (F) 0,00 -0,14 0,17 -0,01 -0,01 0,07 -0,01 -0,02 0,08 -0,55 -0,01 -0,55 -0,07 -0,04 0,10
Ireland (IRL) 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -1,02 0,77 -0,54
Italy (I) -0,03 0,06 0,01 -0,03 0,05 0,06 -0,03 0,07 0,07 -0,04 0,04 0,05 -0,09 0,10 0,07
Netherlands (NL) 0,00 -0,01 0,03 -0,01 0,02 0,01 -0,01 0,03 0,02 -0,02 0,03 0,03 -0,02 0,03 0,01
Austria (A) 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,01 -0,02 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01
Portugal (P) 0,00 -0,02 0,02 0,00 -0,01 0,01 0,00 -0,03 0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01




European Central 0,22 -1,32 0,50 0,29 -0,74 -0,06 0,19 -0,67 -0,25 0,28 -0,65 -0,11 0,34 -0,83 -0,11
Bank (ECB)
Source: Own calculations with the Oxford Economic Forecasting Model (OEF model: version Emerging Market Model, December 1998).
a. The table gives multipliers averaged over two years (1999-2000); d = government budget ratio (measured as an absolute deviation from a baseline
in percent of GDP); b = gross public debt ratio (measured as an absolute deviation from a baseline in percent of GDP); cb = current account ratio
(measured as an absolute deviation from a baseline of the current account balance as a percent of GDP). b. Fiscal policy (responsibility rests on the
EMU member states) is measured by the increase of real government spending of one percent of real GDP. c. Monetary policy (responsibility rests
on the ECB) is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of short-term interest rate (uniform in all EMU countries).
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Table 3 (cont.): Policy Multipliers for Government Budget, Gross Public Debt, and Current Balance in Euroland (EMU)
a
 with implications on













and policy d b cb d b cb d b cb d b cb d b cb
I. Fiscal Policy
b
Belgium (B) -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,04 -0,07 0,02 0,00 -0,01 -0,01 -0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,06
Germany (D) -0,13 0,08 -0,04 0,07 -0,16 0,13 0,03 -0,13 0,15 -0,20 0,24 0,15 -0,03 0,03 0,10 0,50
Spain (E) -0,03 0,02 -0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,02 -0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01 -0,05 0,09 -0,01 0,02 0,02 0,16
France (F) -0,08 0,02 -0,02 0,04 -0,08 0,05 -0,03 0,03 0,04 -0,09 0,09 0,11 -0,02 0,04 0,07 0,45
Ireland (IRL) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Italy (I) -0,92 -0,89 -0,68 -0,02 0,01 0,04 -0,02 0,01 0,07 -0,17 0,25 0,07 -0,04 0,06 0,04 0,43
Netherlands (NL) -0,02 0,05 -0,01 -0,26 -0,45 -0,34 -0,01 0,02 0,02 -0,04 0,07 0,02 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,11
Austria (A) -0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,01 0,01 -1,00 0,74 -0,50 -0,02 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,01 0,05
Portugal (P) 0,00 -0,01 0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,59 -0,16 -0,46 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,02




European Central 0,39 -1,21 0,14 0,43 -0,78 -0,05 0,27 -0,63 -0,24 0,82 -1,58 -0,18 0,25 -0,55 -0,02 -2,19
Bank (ECB)
Source: Own calculations with the Oxford Economic Forecasting Model (OEF model: version Emerging Market Model, December 1998).
a. The table gives multipliers averaged over two years (1999-2000); d = government budget ratio (measured as an absolute deviation from a baseline
in percent of GDP); b = gross public debt ratio (measured as an absolute deviation from a baseline in percent of GDP); cb = current account ratio
(measured as an absolute deviation from a baseline of the current account balance as a percent of GDP). b. Fiscal policy (responsibility rests on the
EMU member states) is measured by the increase of real government spending of one percent of real GDP. c. Monetary policy (responsibility rests
on the ECB) is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of short-term interest rate (uniform in all EMU countries).
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3. COORDINATION OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY IN EMU
In following  Oudiz-Sachs (1984), our strategy for measuring the gains from
coordination is to compare two equilibria: one in which each country plus the
ECB pursues optimal policies taking as given the action of the others
(“noncooperative” or “Nash” equilibrium; in our empirical example the baseline
is identified as the “Nash” equilibrium), and one in which the authorities
“bargain” over a coordinated package of policies (“bargaining” or “cooperative”
equilibrium).
3.1 A Model for the Nash Equilibrium
For the empirical evaluation of the gains from cooperation we use the classic
Tinbergen targets- and-instruments framework (see Oudiz-Sachs, 1984, pp. 59
ff.). We consider a static model, where the economy is represented by a set of
multipliers. These multipliers link various “targets” of each country to policy
instruments. The multipliers are taken from the OEF world model for the period
1999-2001.
The strategy is as follows: In a  n-country world  ) ,..... ( 1
i
m
i i T T T =  is the
vector of country i‘s targets. The baseline or “central variant” projection of 
i T ,
Bi T  is taken from a simulation of the OEF world model. The policy controls for
country i are the elements of vector  ) ,..... ( 1
i
l
i i C C C = . The authorities in country i
maximize a welfare function  ) (
i i T U .
The matrix  Gcontaines the multipliers linking the overall vector of controls
) ,....., , (
2 1 n C C C C =  to the overall vector of targets  ) ,...., , (
2 1 n T T T T = , so that
B T C T + G = . (1)
When  0 = C  then 
B T T = , the baseline corresponds to the situation where
no additional policy actions are taken.
Next we assume that the baseline is a Nash equilibrium for the
ncountries. The optimal policy for each country  i, given the actions of the
others, is  0 =
i C  and consequently 
i B i T T = . This assumption allows us to identify
the key parameters of each country’s utility function. Finally we find the
cooperative equilibrium as the solution to a bargaining problem. A common
utility function, which is given by the weighted sum of the coutries‘ utility
functions, is optimised.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 16
We adopt this framework to model the EMU. In the monetary union
policy instruments are split between the ECB who is in charge of monetary
policy for the union as a whole and the EMU member countries who control
their own fiscal policy.
We consider  10 = n  EMU countries, who’s targets 
i T are the value of the
output gap (
i
t Q ) and inflation as a deviation from target (
i
t p ) over the years 1999
to 2001. Their only policy instrument is fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is measured
by an increase in real government spending of one percent of real GDP
sustained over the period 1999 to 2001. We write this as
) , , , , , ( 2001 2000 1999 2001 2000 1999
i i i i i i i Q Q Q T p p p = , 10 ,..., 1 = i (2)
i i G C = (3)
The ECB is modelled in our empirical analysis as a synthetic 11
th EMU
“country”. This means that the targets of the ECB are the GDP-weighted
averages of those of the 10 EMU countries.  Monetary policy is pursued
centralized by the ECB
) , , , , , ( 2001 2000 1999 2001 2000 1999
ECB ECB ECB ECB ECB ECB ECB Q Q Q T p p p = (4)
ECB ECB M C = (5)
The target variables are GDP-weighted sums of the same variables of the










ECB g p p  with
= i g GDP weights.
Monetary policy is measured by a one percentage-point decrease of  the
short-term interest rate uniform in all countries, sustained over three years.
3.2 Derivation of the Utility Function Parameters
The assumption that the baseline is a Nash equilibrium gives us a first






U  and for the






U . The derivatives can be calculated by





































U p , 11 ,..., 1 = i (6)RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 17
From now on the notation is identical fro the EMU member countries
and the ECB ( ECB i = =11 ).










¶p ) are taken from the OEF
model, the marginal utilities with respect to output and inflation 
i u1  and 
i u2
remain to be determined. The utility functions can be normalized by setting
1 1 =
i u  for all  11 ,..., 1 = i , so that we are left with one equation for every unknown
i u2. As output and inflation are targeted over a period of three years (see equation
(2)), we have to assume a parametric specification af the utility function.
We specify the utility functions for the  i  EMU member countries as
discounted sums of annual quadratic utilities
5, with a fixed time discount factor,
1 . 0 = d :












t i Q U p f m d , 11 ,..., 1 = i (7)
In matrix notation the utility can be written as
iT
i
i i T R T U
2
1
- = , 11 ,..., 1 = i (8)















































) 1 ( 0 0 0 0 0
0 ) 1 ( 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( 0 0
0 0 0 0 ) 1 ( 0
0 0 0 0 0
(9)
                                                              
5 Although, in fact we calculate utility over a three-years time horizon, we still are not dealing
with a full-fledged interemporal optimization problem but with a quasi-static planning
environment. In a intertemporal environment, the current target variables are functions, via
rational expectations, of future policy variables. Then the logic of optimizing our utility
function would be called into question, as Kydland-Prescott (1977) first explained. The time
incosistency problem would arise when the private sector takes action dependent on
anticipations of future policies. The OEF world model used in our exercise to calculate the
policy multipliers is not based on rational expectations.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 18
Now the parameters  i m and  i f are determined by the normalizing
condition and the first order condition in equation (6):























































p f d m d (11)
The results of the derivatives of the national utility functions at the Nash
equilibrium (
i u1 ,
i u2 ), as well as the derived utility function parameters ( i m ,  i f )
are presented in Table 4 . A high value of  i m signifies that the country has a
priority for the output target in its utility function, which is the case for Belgium,
Ireland and the Neatherlands. The inflation target is more important (indicated
by high values of  i f ) for Germany, Austria, Finland, Spain and of course for the
ECB.
One has, however, to keep in minde that the parameters of the utility
functions are dependent both on the baseline and the policy tradeoffs the
countries are confronted with. And of course, the parameter are time-dependend.
In our case we use the period 1999-2001. In an other period or business-cycle
phase they could be different.
Table 4: Partial Derivatives of National Utility Functions at Nash Equilibrium










Belgium B 1 -0.264 0.424 0.056
Germany D 1 -1.126 0.136 0.229
Spain E 1 -2.288 0.036 0.408
France F 1 -1.093 0.069 0.276
Ireland IRL 1 -2.474 0.181 0.264
Italy I 1 -0.953 0.036 0.175
Netherlands NL 1 -1.032 0.358 0.184
Austria A 1 -1.739 0.140 0.375
Portugal P 1 -0.309 0.177 0.030
Finland FIN 1 -1.683 0.145 0.302
ECB
a ECB 1 -0.687 0.074 0.137
a
 ECB is the “11
th EMU member country”. The respective parameters are derived from a
weighted utility function with GDP weights of the EMU member countries.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 19
By setting  1 1 =
i u  we normalized the marginal utility of a GDP increase
(relative to the baseline) sutained for three years to equal 1. So 
i u2 measures the
welfare cost, in GDP equivalents, of a one percentage point increase in inflation
held for three years. A value of  2 2 - =
i u , for example, means that on the margin,
policy makers are indifferent between a one percentage point rise in inflation
and a sustained GDP loss of two percent relative to baseline. In the empirical
analysis the values of 
i u2 for many countries is about 1. Small rises in inflation
are equivalent to a one percent GDP loss for Belgium, Portugal and the ECB
( 1 2 <
i u ).
Having these marginal weights, one can examine the scope for policy
coordination. In a first step, we consider the effect on utility of country i of a
rise in  G  in country  j . By assumption, the own-effects of policy actions are
zero at the Nash equilibrium. Then we get the cross-country gains from fiscal
and monetary expansion at the baseline (at  Nash equilibrium). Formally, the












where ji G is the block matrix of G which contains the multipliers of country i‘s
targets with respect to country  j ‘s controls. The results are presented in Table 5.
The cross-country gains (spill-over effects) are very low, in some cases even
negative.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 20
Table 5: Cross-Country Gains from Fiscal and Monetary Expansion at Nash Equilibrium
(




B D E F IRL I
B 0 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.015
D 0.001 0 0.024 0.046 0.000 0.062
E 0.001 0.055 0 0.052 0.000 0.059
F 0.005 0.049 0.026 0 0.000 0.054
IRL -0.024 -0.100 -0.007 -0.059 0 -0.100
I 0.007 0.046 0.018 0.041 0.000 0
NL -0.007 -0.032 -0.010 -0.038 0.006 -0.073
A -0.005 0.072 0.024 0.042 0.000 0.045
P -0.012 -0.085 0.017 -0.051 0.005 -0.155
FIN -0.020 -0.049 0.002 -0.044 0.003 -0.043
ECB
b -0.007 0.124 0.063 0.084 0.004 0.041
 i= rows
j = columns
NL A P FIN ECB
B 0.0040 0.000 0.001 0.002 -0.077
D 0.011 -0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.429
E 0.018 0.011 0.008 0.003 -0.502
F 0.018 0.008 0.002 0.002 -0.355
IRL -0.020 -0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.100
I 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.252
NL 0 -0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.150
A 0.008 0 0.002 0.000 -0.432
P -0.008 -0.007 0 -0.005 0.431
FIN -0.004 -0.007 0.007 0 -0.124
ECB
b 0.021 0.012 0.003 0.011 0
a The policy actions of the countries in the columns (
j C , fiscal and monetary policies) have
an impact on the utility of the countries in the rows (
i U ). Fiscal policy is independently
executed by each of the 10 EMU countries. Monetary policy in the EMU is centrally executed
by the ECB for the whole EMU area.
b The utility of the ECB (
ECB U ) is measured by a weighted utility function with GDP weights
of the EMU member countries.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 21
3.3 Evaluation of the Cooperative Equilibrium
We remember that in the  Nash equilibrium the maximization problem for
country i was given by
) ( max i i




ECB i T C C C T + G = ) , ,..., (
10 1 (14)
where  i G  is the block matrix of  G which contains the policy multipliers of
country i‘s targets with respect to policy actions of all countries and the ECB.
By construction the optimal solution of the maximisation is given by
) 0 ,... 0 ( =
N C and  ) ,..., (
1 BECB B N T T T = .
A  cooperative equilibrium corresponds to the case where all the
countries act jointly so as to maximize a collective utility function. This
collective utility function is assumed to be a weighted average of each country’s
own utility function.





11 2 1 ) ,..... , ( (15)
The weights granted to each country in the cooperative process are
denoted by 
11 2 1 ,..... , w w w . For the practical process of cooperation the question
arises which are the correct weights. Remembering the complicated framework
of coordination described in chapter 2, one must conclude that the final level of
coordination in EMU is the Council (the Ecofin). In the Council for a qualified
majority the votes are weighted according to Article 205(2) TEC. That means
the large countries have 10 votes, the medium-sized countries 5 votes and the
small countries have votes from 2 to 4 votes. In total there are 87 votes. For
most of the measures taken under the cooperation procedure a qualified majority
is needed. That means the most plausible weighting scheme for a EMU-wide
utility function is those according to the voting power of the EMU member
countries in the Ecofin. Taking ECB as a large country an re-weighting on the
basis of the 10 EMU member countries we get our weighting scheme for the
EMU-wide utility function.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 22
Equation (15) can be expressed alternatively in matrix notation as:
T
C
C T w w w TR w w w U ) ,..... , (
2
1
) ,..... , (







































w w w RC (17)





C T w w w TR w w w U ) ,..... , (
2
1
) ,..... , ( max
11 2 1 11 2 1 - = (18)
s.t.  B T C T + G = (19)
The solution to this problem (if there are no constraints or if they are not
binding) can be derived analytically and is given by




B C R R T C (20)
B C C T C T + G = (21)










+ - = - . (22)
The argument for coordination can be demonstrated by a two-country
example in a simple diagram (see Oudiz-Sachs, 1984, p. 27). In  Figure 1 the
indifference curves for countries  1 and  2 are drawn in (
1 C ,
2 C ) space. It is
assumed that 
2 1/ C U ¶ ¶  and 
1 2 / C U ¶ ¶  are both positive. That means that the
influence of the other country’s policy action exerts a positive impact on the
home country. At the Nash equilibrium,  N , 
1 C  is chosen to maximize 
1 U  given
N C
2 , so that the indifference curve for 1 is horizontal at N  (that is,  0 /
1 1 = ¶ ¶ C U );
similarly the indifference curve for 2 is vertical at  N . Now, when 
1 C  is changed
in the direction  ) / (
1 2 C U ¶ ¶ v , the domestic control is moved by the vector 
1 dC
(v  is a positive small positive number). For small changes,  0
1 » dU  and  0
2 > dURSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 23
(actually, 
1 U  falls by a second-order term, while 
2 U  rises by a first-order term).
The vertical vector in the figure represents 
2 dC . By the same argument, a small
rise in 
2 C  leads to  0
1 > dU  and  0
2 » dU . A cooperative equilibrium would be
given by a sum of vectors 
1 dC  and 
2 dC , shown as the upward-sloping vector at
point  N . It clearly moves into a region of joint welfare improvement.
Figure 1: The Geometry of Policy Coordination in EMU
Two-country case: 
1 C  = (fiscal) policy of country 1; 
2 C  = (fiscal) policy of country  2.
N U1  and  
N U 2  are the indifference (utility) curves of country 1 and country  2 respectively.
C E  = equilibrium with unrestraint cooperation. 
SGP E  = equilibrium with cooperation under
the constraint of the stability and growth pact (SGP).
Source: Oudiz-Sachs (1984, p. 27) with own adjustments.
The region between the two indifference curves 
N U1  and 
N U 2  describes the
entire set of policy moves that are Pareto improving vis-a-vis  N . In a non-EMU
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the indifference curves of countries 1 and 2 are tangent. When no movement of
1 C  and 
2 C  from 
C E  can be Pareto improving, 
C E  is an efficient policy
equilibrium. The equilibrium 
C E  would be the optimal solution in a normal two-
country world, where each country has full control over all policy instruments.
However, in EMU – as described in chapter 2 – the framework is different. Even
if point 
C E  might be the Pareto efficient coordination equilibrium, the Stability
and Growth Pact (SGP) with its limitations of the government budget deficit to 3
percent of GDP as an upper limit and the medium term target of close to balance
acts as a constraint for an unrestricted coordination equilibrium. Under the
restrictive regime of the SGP the policy coordination outcome might result in an
second-best equilibrium at point 
SGP E  (see Figure 1). As our results show, this is
exactly the case. The SGP is binding for an optimal policy coordination
outcome. These arguments can easily be generalized to a  - n country world.
3.4 Gains from Cooperation
Based on the optimization procedure for cooperation described in the equations
(19) and (20) we can calculate optimization gains for two scenarios, for (1) a
“full cooperation” (all EMU countries coordinate their fiscal policy with the
monetary policy of the ECB) and, (2) for a “partial cooperation” (where only the
EMU countries coordinate their fiscal policy and the ECB stays aside). In both
scenarios, firstly the unconstrained results are reported. Then restrictions to
guarantee Pareto improvement are introduced and constraints by the SGP have
to be taken into account. The numerical optimization are carried out with GAMS
(General Algebraic Modeling System).
3.4.1 Gains from Full Fiscal and Monetary Policy Cooperation
Unconstrained cooperative equilibrium:
In a first step the  cooperative equilibrium is calculated according to the
optimization problem of the equations (18) and (19). This gives the
unconstrained results for the optimal policy vector  C C  of equation (20) (see
Table 6) and hence the policy targets at cooperation  C T  according to equation
(21) (see the Tables 7 and 8).RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 25
Table 6: Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Cooperation and Welfare Gains from
Cooperation in EMU
Optimal Utility Utility Welfare
Policy At Nash at Cooperative gain
a
Equilibrium Equilibrium




Belgium (B) 6,223 -0,707 -1,098 -0,391
Germany (D) 3,799 -3,045 -1,419 1,626
Spain (E) 5,913 -8,183 -5,964 2,219
France (F) 4,165 -3,661 -2,133 1,528
Ireland (IRL) 7,217 -5,475 -7,154 -1,679
Italy (I) 2,302 -6,288 -4,934 1,354
Netherlands (NL) 2,220 -1,724 -5,037 -3,313
Austria (A) 6,258 -2,962 -1,295 1,667
Portugal (P) 4,437 -2,206 -5,777 -3,571






-3,549 -3,402 -2,156 1,246
TOTAL - -3,985 -3,425 0,560
a
 The unit of welfare gain is equivalent to a percentage change in GDP, averaged over three
years (1999-2001).
b
 The unit of fiscal policy is a sustained increase of government spending equal x percent of
GDP.
c
 The unit of monetary policy is a sustained decrease of EMU's short-term interest rate of x
percent.
d
 Welfare of the ECB is calculated from a welfare function with GDP weighted target
variables: output and inflation.
e
 Weighted average of the national utility levels (weights according to council votes; ECB is a
large country).
Weighted total utility of EMU is maximized.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 26
Table 7: Outcome of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Optimization with Cooperation: Output and
Inflation
1999 2000 2001






B -0,72 -1,08 -0,20 -0,97 -1,83 -0,48
D -2,63 -4,64 -1,60 -2,51 -1,26 -0,52
E -11,22 -15,01 -8,64 -8,93 -5,62 -5,95
F -4,29 -6,84 -4,06 -5,16 -3,80 -3,60
IRL 1,48 -0,90 -2,15 -2,43 -5,02 -2,92
I -11,77 -12,89 -8,62 -9,92 -6,67 -6,82
NL 1,51 -0,66 -1,46 -0,65 -4,74 -1,87
A -1,63 -3,49 -1,21 -2,55 -2,34 -1,60
P 1,47 -0,09 -4,05 -2,69 -6,97 -3,78
FIN -0,12 -2,28 -2,66 -2,66 -5,02 -2,65
ECB
b -4,82 -6,88 -3,88 -4,71 -3,45 -2,88
II. Inflation
B 3,76 1,31 0,12 1,89 -0,09 2,08
D 0,57 0,85 2,05 2,28 1,55 2,42
E 1,50 1,88 2,15 2,16 2,08 2,13
F 0,87 0,98 1,64 1,58 1,06 1,87
IRL 2,78 2,96 4,06 3,73 3,93 3,64
I 1,65 1,98 1,35 1,96 1,42 2,05
NL 1,87 1,89 2,32 2,01 1,54 2,27
A 0,84 1,26 1,21 1,73 1,43 2,18
P 3,90 3,50 5,04 3,92 3,44 3,85
FIN 1,95 1,83 2,34 2,29 2,02 2,01
ECB
 b 1,24 1,37 1,81 2,04 1,46 2,19
a
 Target values are as follows: output gap, zero (full employment); inflation, zero. TC = target
values at cooperative equilibrium; TB = target values at baseline (Nash equilibrium).
b
 The outcome for the ECB is equivalent to the GDP weighted average of those of the EMU
member countries.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 27
Table 8:  Outcome of Fiscal and Monetary Policy Optimization with Cooperation:
Government Budget and GrossPublic Debt
1999 2000 2001







B -5,81 1,29 -5,56 1,70 -6,55 1,70
D -2,80 0,84 -2,73 1,14 -3,49 1,30
E -4,51 1,08 -5,28 1,36 -5,60 1,41
F -2,74 0,35 -2,98 1,07 -3,47 1,33
IRL -4,16 5,36 -4,76 5,24 -5,61 5,21
I -3,81 0,58 -4,07 0,84 -4,65 1,00
NL 1,17 1,85 -0,40 1,85 -2,37 1,99
A -6,04 0,82 -6,60 1,19 -7,07 1,73
P -5,77 0,40 -8,28 0,18 -10,87 0,00
FIN -2,33 2,99 -3,21 3,09 -4,16 3,18
ECB
b -3,18 0,87 -3,49 1,23 -4,21 1,41
II. Gross Public
Debt
B 58,58 55,72 61,99 52,24 68,67 48,27
D 6,21 5,31 9,75 4,96 14,83 4,56
E 11,20 10,43 16,78 8,42 20,85 6,44
F 5,52 5,15 8,92 4,34 12,35 3,04
IRL -4,76 -9,24 -1,89 -15,69 2,78 -21,44
I 55,80 54,92 56,02 51,27 58,08 47,54
NL 4,29 5,40 5,88 4,12 9,91 2,86
A 5,93 3,13 12,45 2,25 19,81 0,96
P 1,08 -1,52 8,66 -2,03 19,81 -2,37
FIN -7,75 -9,80 -3,92 -12,34 0,71 -14,90
ECB
b 17,68 16,81 20,76 15,24 24,89 13,50
a
 Target values are as follows: government budget balance to GDP ratio, -3 percent of GDP
Stability and Growth Pact upper limit); gross public debt to GDP ratio, 60 percent of GDP. A
negative (positive) sign indicates that the budget deficit and/or the public debt target is
violated (is below target) by x percent of GDP. TC = target values at cooperative equilibrium;
TB = target values at baseline (Nash equilibrium).
b
 The outcome for the ECB is equivalent to the GDP weighted average of those of the EMU
member countries.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 28
Using the weighting according to the votes in the Council, total utility in
the EMU at cooperative equilibrium is higher by 0.56% of GDP
6 than in the
case of the Nash equilibrium (or in the baseline; see Table 6). This implies an
optimal fiscal policy
7 impulse (increase of real public expenditures) in the EMU
member states by 2 1/4 percent of GDP in the Netherlands and Italy to 7.2
percent of GDP in Ireland. As an optimal monetary policy the ECB would have
to decrease the short-term interest rate y 3.5 percentage points. Although in this
unconstraint optimization solution total EMU utility would increase, in some
EMU member states cooperation would lead to a welfare loss compared to the
baseline situation (or non-cooperation). This is not an Pareto optimal solution
for all EMU members.
Full economic policy cooperation would lead to an improvement in the
targets (output and inflation) in most countries compared to the baseline solution
in the three years (1999-2001) under examination (see Table 7).
The most unpleasant result concerns the fiscal targets of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP), namely the budget deficits (upper bound of 3% of GDP)
and the public debt to GDP ratio (60%). In practically all EMU member
countries the full policy coordination scenario would lead to a violation of the
SGP targets (see Table 8 ). Whereas in the baseline
8 all EMU member states
exhibit already a fiscal balance below the 3% of GDP deficit target of the SGP,
after the massive fiscal impulse, as the optimization solution for cooperation
would imply this target would be violated by all countries (except the
Netherlands) not only at the end of the three year period but already in 1999.
Confronted with this violation of the vital EMU fiscal policy targets one
has to question the room for manoeuvre for fiscal and monetary policy
coordination in EMU. In the next step we look therefore for the degree of
welfare gains from cooperation, given the constraints of a Pareto optimal
solution concerning utilities for all EMU countries (they should all be positive)
and the objective that the fiscal targets (budget deficits and public debt) are not
violated.
                                                              
6 As Oudiz-Sachs (1984, p. 64) have shown, small utility gains are equivalent to percent
changes in GDP.
7 If one would choose equal weights  i w  in equation (19) instead of our choice of voting
power in the Council the respective values for optimal policy would be lower. For fiscal
policy between 0.9% of GDP in Italy to 3.6% in Ireland, and the monetary policy impuls
would only be –1.8%.
8 A comparison of the baseline forecast of the OEF world model with the stability
programmes submitted by the EMU member states under the SGP rules early in 1999 shows
no big differences in the budgetary position and also in the debt to GDP ratios.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 29
Constrained cooperative equilibrium:
Now, we take into consideration the two additional constraints for cooperation:
1. Pareto optimality constraint: All countries must improve their welfare
or should at least not be worse off than in the non-cooperative situation
(
Ni Ci U U ‡ ). Such a condition is necessary when bargaining for policy
cooperation.
2. Stability and Growth Pact constraint: The SGP aims at a budgetary
position of the EMU member states of close to balance or in surplus in the
medium-run. An excess over this reference value is only allowed when it results
from a severe economic downturn which is exceptional (i.e. when real GDP
declines by at least 2% per annum). In our empirical analysis we only
concentrate at the upper bound of the SGP budget deficit target of 3% of GDP
which we use as an additional condition for the optimization procedure. The








is the government budget balance to GDP ratio deviation
from its target value (-3 percent of GDP) and 
~
G are the multipliers on
government budget balance to GDP ratio. Baseline and multipliers are taken
from the the OEF model in an analogous way to the values of 
B T and  Gin
equation (1).
These two constraints for calculating a cooperative equilibrium reduces
the room for manoeuvre for an optimal fiscal and monetary policy dramatically
(see Table 9). Total utility improves only slightly by 0.013% GDP. Only France
and Austria can expect a small improve in their welfare from cooperation. The
pattern of optimal fiscal policy varies from –0.4% in Germany to 2.3% in
Ireland. The ECB would reduce short-term interest rates only by 0.3%. This
implies that an optimal solution under the two constraints results in a fiscal
policy pattern which allocates to some countries a fiscal expansion whereas
others should restrict their fiscal policy!RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 30
Table 9: Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy with Cooperation and Welfare Gains from
Cooperation in EMU (Utility and SGP constrained)
Optimal Utility Utility Welfare
Policy at Nash at Cooperative Gain
a
Equilibrium Equilibrium
CC UN UC (UC –UN)
I. Fiscal Policy
b
Belgium (B) 0,297 -0,707 -0,707 0,000
Germany (D) -0,419 -3,045 -3,045 0,000
Spain (E) 1,235 -8,184 -8,184 0,000
France (F) -0,279 -3,661 -3,610 0,051
Ireland (IRL) 2,272 -5,475 -5,475 0,000
Italy (I) -0,180 -6,287 -6,287 0,000
Netherlands (NL) 0,272 -1,725 -1,725 0,000
Austria (A) 0,754 -2,962 -2,852 0,110
Portugal (P) -0,124 -2,206 -2,206 0,000






-0,308 -3,402 -3,402 0,000
Total - -3,985 -3,972 0,013
a
 The unit of welfare gain is equivalent to a percentage change in GDP, averaged over three
years(1999-2001).
b
  The unit of fiscal policy is a sustained increase of government spending equal x percent of
GDP.
c 
 The unit of monetary policy is a sustained decrease of EMU's short-term interest rate of x
percent.
d
  Welfare of the ECB is calculated from a welfare function with GDP weighted target
variables: output and inflation. e Weighted average of the national utility levels (weights
according to council votes; ECB is a large country). Weighted total utility of EMU is
maximized.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 31
Table 10: Optimal Fiscal Policy with Cooperation and Welfare Gains from Cooperation in
EMU
Optimal Utility Utility Welfare
Policy At Nash at Cooperative gain
a
Equilibrium Equilibrium
CC UN UC (UC - UN)
I. Fiscal Policy
b
Belgium (B) -0,494 -0,707 -0,707 0,000
Germany (D) 0,398 -3,045 -3,035 0,010
Spain (E) 0,690 -8,183 -8,179 0,004
France (F) 0,384 -3,661 -3,636 0,025
Ireland (IRL) 0,199 -5,475 -5,556 -0,081
Italy (I) 0,125 -6,288 -6,246 0,042
Netherlands (NL) 0,196 -1,724 -1,785 -0,061
Austria (A) 0,393 -2,962 -2,905 0,057
Portugal (P) 0,094 -2,206 -2,267 -0,061






0,000 -3,402 -3,268 0,134
Total - -3,985 -3,965 0,020
a
 The unit of welfare gain is equivalent to a percentage change in GDP, averaged over three
years  (1999-2001).
b
 The unit of fiscal policy is a sustained increase of government spending equal x percent of
GDP.
c
 The unit of monetary policy is a sustained decrease of EMU's short-term interest rate of x
percent.
d
 Welfare of the ECB is calculated from a welfare function with GDP weighted target
variables: output and inflation.
e
 Weighted average of the national utility levels (weights according to council votes; ECB is a
large country). Weighted total utility of EMU is maximized.RSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 32
4.4.2 Gains from Partial, only Fiscal Policy Cooperation
In case of a fiscal cooperation only among the EMU member countries with an
ECB not participating, the welfare gains would be only 0.02% of GDP. The
fiscal impulses would be below 1% of GDP (in Belgium the fiscal policy should
even be restrictionist). Four out of 10 EMU countries would be worse off with
cooperation compared to non-cooperation (see Table 10).
The advantage of this partial cooperation would be that the SGP targets
would practically not be violated. Due to the small fiscal impulse the direct
targets of optimization (output-gap and inflation) would only slightly be
improved. If one introduces the additional constraints (Pareto optimality
concerning welfare in each country; SGP targets) the cooperative welfare gains
would be practically nil.
In both cases, a constrained cooperative solution (results in Table 9) and a
partial cooperation scenario (results in Table 10) lead to a situation which leads
the EMU countries back to the baseline or Nash equilibrium (as demonstrated in
Figure 1 ). Only full cooperation leads to massive welfare gains, however, it
violates some basic targets (each country gains and the SGP objectives are
binding).
CONCLUSIONS
With a large-scale econometric world model we calculate the multipliers for
fiscal and monetary policy for 10 EMU countries and the ECB. Fiscal policy is
in the responsibility of the EMU member countries, monetary policy is
conducted centrally by the ECB for Euroland. Then in a Tinbergen-like
approach we link targets to policy instruments. In order to evaluate the gains
from cooperation we compare a cooperative equilibrium with the non-
cooperative one (by definition the baseline scenario is called the Nash
equilibrium). The cooperative equilibrium is the result of the maximization of a
weighted utility function with derived parameters for the targets output gap and
inflation. In the case of a “full” cooperation, where the 10 EMU countries
coordinate their fiscal policy with the monetary policy of the ECB the welfare
gains obtained are very large for Euroland as a whole. However the strong fiscal
and monetary policy impulses as a result of this optimization procedure lead,
firstly to a violation of the fiscal targets (budget deficit, public debt) of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which limits the room for manoeuvre of fiscal
policy of the EMU member states in stage III of EMU. Secondly, we find that
not in all countries cooperation leads to welfare gains, a result which is not
Pareto efficient. Therefore, by considering these two constraints (ParetoRSC 99/9 © Fritz Breuss and Andrea Weber 33
optimality and SGP objectives) the constrained optimization leads to a solution
in case of “full” cooperation which drives most countries back to the Nash
position at the baseline. In addition, a “partial” cooperation in which the ECB
stays aside and only the fiscal policies of the EMU member countries are active,
leads to a very small welfare improvement and violates again (only to minor
degree the Pareto optimality condition). The optimal fiscal policy impulses are
very modest.
The policy implications are twofold: First, our results indicate that –
taking realistic data over the next three years – the SGP might have a very
strong limiting impact on the efforts for a positive or active cooperation in EMU
which would lead to more output and employment. Second, the EMU consists of
still not fully harmonized economies with different reactions to policy shocks.
That means the present EMU still does not present an optimum currency area. It
may well be, however, that in the medium-run the single currency leads to a
stronger real convergence (convergence of the business cycle and to a
comparable impact of similar policy shocks).
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